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Abstract 
As  we  look  to  the  future  management  and development  of the  Nile  River Basin  Water 
Resources through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI),  it is useful to review the challenges faced 
by the Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO) and their impact on its performance.  The  KBO was 
established  with  the  primary  goal  of alleviating  poverly  and  achieving  socio-economic 
development  in  the  Kagera  Basin.  It  met  this  objective  with  mixed  results.  Its 
underperformance has generally been attributed to an ambitious mandate that stretched way 
beyond the functions of a River Basin Organisation and the Kagera's territorial jurisdiction.  In 
a progressive institution,  such a mandate would have presented increased opporlunities for 
trade-offs among the parlicipants. But because the KBO was built on a weak social resources 
foundation,  it  lacked  the  adaptive  capacity to  survive  the  historical,  political and cultural 
dynamics between the riparians. 
The paper, thus, explores the concept of  Institutional Adaptive Capacity and the interaction of 
technical  and social ingenuity  as critical success factors  in  institutional  development  and 
sustenance.  A lesson learnt from  the  KBO experience is that a sustain  ability level of social 
resources will be required to identify,  define and deploy the appropriate development, reform 
and adaptation mechanisms to transform the NBI into a lasting regime of  cooperation. 
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Historical Background 
The  Kagera  Basin  Organisation  (KBO)  was  established  in  1977  as  a  result  of diplomatic 
initiatives  to  operationalise  the  concept of regional  and  basin-wide  planning  in  the  Kagera 
Basin.  The  first  step  was  taken  in  1969 when  a United  Nations  Development Programme 
(UNDP)  fact  finding  mission,  in  consultation  with  the  governments  of Burundi,  Rwanda, 
Tanzania  and  Uganda,  recommended  that  a  technical  committee  be  established  to 
coordinate  orderly  regional  planning.  The  committee  was  established  between  Burundi, 
Rwanda  and  Tanzania;  Uganda  preferring  to  participate  in  an  observer role.  In  1970,  the 
committee  submitted  a  successful  funding  proposal  to  the  UNDP  for  the  Kagera  Basin 
Development studies, which were launched in 1971. The first phase, which lasted up to 1973, 
consisted  largely  of data  collection  and  analysis,  with  emphasis  on  tourism;  hydropower 
potential;  fisheries;  and  institutional  arrangements.  This  data,  together  with  the  national 
priorities of the three States, then formed the basis for the preparation of the Indicative Basin 
Plan that was submitted in  1976 at the end of Phase II. The committee also commissioned a 
separate study on  harnessing hydroelectric power at Rusomo Falls on  the Kagera, and the 
environmental and commercial implications of such a development.  From the initial findings 
of these  studies,  it was  clear that all the riparian  States shared  common  problems in  most 
fields of economic and  social development; and  that a medium was required through which 
the  basin's development potential could be  realised  by jointly coordinating the  planning and 
exploitation  of the  sub-region's  resources.  And  so  it  was  that  on  August  24,  1977  the 
Agreement  establishing  the  Organisation  for  the  Development  and  Management  of  the 
1 Kagera  River  Basin,  commonly known  as the  KBO,  was signed  between  Burundi,  Rwanda 
and Tanzania at Rusomo. Uganda acceded to it in  1981. 
At  its  inception,  it  was  envisaged  that  the  KBO  would  deal,  and  I quote  Article  IV  of the 
Treaty,  "all  questions relevant to  the  activities to  be  carried  out in  the  Kagera  Basin"(FAO, 
1997: 37). After two donor support mobilisation conferences, in  Paris in  1979 and Geneva in 
1982, the organisation's governing organs finally articulated this objective into the conduct of 
studies  for  the  implementation  of fourteen  priority  projects  in  four  key  sectors  namely: 
Transport and  Communications; Energy; Agriculture; and Information and Training. By 1992, 
project documents and feasibility study reports  had  been  prepared for most of the  projects. 
However, there was limited  success in  raising  funds  for their implementation. At the time of 
its  dissolution,  this  list of projects  had  further  been  prioritised  into  four:  the  Rusomo  Falls 
Hydroelectric Power Project; Phase  II  of the Tsetsefly and Trypanosomiasis Control  Project; 
the  Rehabilitation  of the  Miramira  Hill-Ntungamo-ishaka  road;  and  the  Rehabilitation  of the 
Mutukula-Bukoba-Biharamulo-Lusahanga  road.  The  presentation  of funding  proposals  for 
these projects to the donors was scheduled for June  1995 but had to be  called  off following 
the April to July 1994 war in  Rwanda. 
KBO's performance 
Though  institutions are  much  broader than  mere organisations,  a review of the  factors that 
influence  institutions  is  necessary  for  a  fair  assessment  of  the  KBO's  performance. 
Institutional  literature  lists  some  of these  factors  as  historical  precedents,  constitutional 
provisions,  political  arrangements,  demographic  conditions,  resources  endowment,  and 
economic  development.  Thus,  the  process  of  institutional  design  and  the  resulting 
frameworks,  policy  and  administrative  arrangements  are  invariably  a  reflection  of  the 
particular  blend  of these  factors,  which  in  turn  defines  the  goals  and  objectives  of any 
institution (Bromley, 1989a, 1989b; Commons, 1968; North, 1990). 
For  the  KBO,  the  overriding  need  was  to  disenclave  its  landlocked  hinterland  and,  in  the 
process,  provide  opportunities  to  exploit  the  sub-region's  hitherto  untapped  natural 
resources.  Its  original  mandate  extended  way  beyond  the  Kagera  river  catchment  and 
reflected  a development agenda  expected  more  of a regional  development agency than  a 
River Basin Organisation (RBO). None of its wide array of projects was in  line with such core 
functions  of a  RBO  as  hydrological  studies,  pollution  control,  environmental  protection,  or 
ecological conservation. In this context, the overall performance of the KBO is relatively more 
difficult to assess for neither the criteria for evaluating a development agency nor that for a 
RBO  seem appropriate. And  since the KBO's Indicative Basin Plan  read  more like a specific 
project development list than  a development strategy,  its  performance can  be  evaluated  in 
terms  of the  extent  to  which  the  Priority  Action  Programme
1  (PAP)  was  implemented.  Its 
achievements on this front included: 
The  KBO  regional  telecommunications  project:  This  was  the  organisation's  main 
achievement.  With  funds from  tHe  African  Development Bank,  interconnection  between the 
four  member States'  Capitals  and  a  number of key  towns  was  made  possible  using  high 
quality terrestrial microwave links and  modern switching equipment. This eliminated the need 
to  route  calls  through  Europe,  and  not only  reduced  the  costs  of making  calls  within  East 
Africa but also improved the quality of connection. Rwanda and Burundi gained direct access 
to the East African Telecommunications network - with the possibility of tapping into the main 
PANAFTEL  network for  Eastern  and  Central  Africa,  while  Uganda  had  the  opportunity of 
1 A list of 14 projects in  the four key sectors of Transport and Communications; Energy; Agriculture; and 
Information and Training,  which was anived at after the donor community advised that the Indicative Basin 
Plan was too incomplete for funding consideration. 
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